We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.
Introduction
A bankruptcy problem refers to a situation in which one has to distribute, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible commodity whose available amount is not enough to cover all agents' demands on it. This is a classic allocation problem, which encompasses many different situations like the bankruptcy of a firm, the division of an insufficient estate, or the collection of a given amount of taxes. Although instances of bankruptcy problems (and solutions for them) are already documented in ancient sources, such as the Talmud, Aristotle's books or Maimonides' essays, their formalization was not presented till the early eighties [6] . The reader is referred to [7] for a review of the fast-expanding literature concerning this model. An early (and influential) contribution within this field is due to Aumann and Maschler [1] who, among other things, initiated the so-called game-theoretical approach to bankruptcy problems. Aumann and Maschler also provided a specific formula to rationalize the (apparently unrelated) solutions to several bankruptcy situations that appear in the Talmud. Their formula, which came to be known as the Talmud rule, implements a basic principle by which individual rationing is of the same type as collective rationing. More precisely, if the amount to divide is below half of the aggregate claim then no agent gets more than half of her claim, whereas if the amount exceeds half of the aggregate claim then no agent gets less than half of her claim. The same principle can be implemented while considering all possible shares of the amount to divide in the aggregate claim. That is, for any given value θ ∈ [0, 1], we may construct the rule that distributes the amount accordingly so that nobody gets more than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide is smaller than θ times the aggregate claim and nobody gets less than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide exceeds θ times the aggregate claim [5] . The family, so constructed, would have the Talmud rule as a focal element, but would also encompass, as extreme cases, two classical rules that can be traced back to Maimonides; namely, the so-called constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules.
We provide in this note a general coalitional procedure characterizing each of the rules within the family described above. Our procedure is also inspired by a Talmudic principle, regarding bankruptcy problems, according to which the creditors empower each other. For instance, in a three-agent problem in which agents are increasingly ranked according to their claims, the third empowers the second to deal with the first [1] .
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and basic concepts. Section
We study bankruptcy problems in a variable population model. The set of potential creditors, or agents, is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of finite subsets of N, with generic element N . Let n denote the cardinality of N . For each i ∈ N , let c i ∈ R + be i's claim and c ≡ (c i ) i∈N the claims profile. Without loss of generality, we assume that
A bankruptcy problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , a claims profile c ∈ R n + , and an amount to be divided E ∈ R + such that i∈N c i ≥ E. Let C ≡ i∈N c i . To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume C > 0. Let D N be the set of rationing problems with population N and
Given a problem (N, c, E) ∈ D N , an allocation is a vector x ∈ R n satisfying the following three conditions:
• Balance: i∈N x i = E, and
A bankruptcy rule on D, R : D → N ∈N R n , associates with each problem (N, c, E) ∈ D an allocation R (N, c, E) for the problem. Some classical rules are the constrained equal awards rule, which distributes the amount equally among all agents, subject to no agent receiving more than what she claims; the constrained equal losses rule, which imposes that losses are as equal as possible, subject to no one receiving a negative amount; and the proportional rule, which yields awards proportionally to claims. The following family of rules encompasses two of those rules, while generalizing another one. The family is defined by means of a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1].
The rule R θ in the family resolves bankruptcy problems according to the following principle:
Nobody gets more than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide is less than θ times the aggregate claim and nobody gets less than a fraction θ of her claim if the amount to divide exceeds θ times the aggregate claim. Formally:
The TAL-family consists of all rules with the following form: For some θ ∈ [0, 1], for all (N, c, E) ∈ D, and all i ∈ N ,
http://www.upo.es/econ
The constrained equal losses rule corresponds to the case θ = 0, whereas the constrained equal awards rule corresponds to the case θ = 1. The so-called Talmud rule [1] is obtained for
One can visualize the rule R θ as follows. First, it applies equal division until the creditor with the smallest claim has obtained a fraction θ of her claim. Then, that agent stops receiving additional units and the remaining amount is divided equally among the other agents until the creditor with the second smallest claim gets the fraction θ of her claim. The process continues until every agent has received a fraction θ of her claim, or the available amount is distributed.
If there is still something left after this process, agents are invited back to receive additional shares. Now agents receive additional amounts sequentially starting with those with larger claims and applying equal division of their losses.
It is interesting to provide the following alternative definition of the rules within the family for the two-agent case. Formally, given θ ∈ [0, 1], each rule in the TAL-family has the following expression, in the two-agent case:
It is straightforward to show from (1) that any possible allocation x, for a given two-agent problem (N, c, E), can be obtained as a realization of a given rule within the family. Formally,
It is also worth mentioning that (1) can also be seen as a two-stage allocation process. In the first stage, agents' claims are weighted to reflect exogenous factors that do not appear in our benchmark model of bankruptcy problems. For instance, the liquidation of a firm might have a cost per se, which should be borne by the creditors. Alternatively, if two heirs agree on a procedure to divide a bequest, without resorting to an outside authority, they might be saving part of their awards. The former case could be reflected by reducing (equally) the claims of both agents. The second one could be reflected by increasing (equally) the claims of both agents. In the second stage, the "standard solution" (conceding each agent what the other does not claim, and dividing the remainder equally) is applied to the resulting problem.
In this section, we design coalition formation mechanisms leading to the outcomes of the rules in the TAL-family. More precisely, fix some θ ∈ [0, 1], and consider the following procedure.
First, in the case of a two-agent problem, we apply the solution (1) . Suppose now that we have a problem with three creditors. Then, we proceed in the following way. (ii) Assign equal awards to all creditors.
(iii) Assign equal losses to all creditors.
Specifically, (i) is applied whenever it yields an order-preserving result, which is precisely,
We apply (ii) when E ≤ nθc 1 . Finally, we apply (iii) when
We call this generalization, the θ−coalitional procedure. In the particular case of θ = , and the coalition, 510 − 100 · θ = , which is order preserving. Now, if θ = to the coalition. It is straightforward to see that we can apply
(1) until the last step, obtaining the order preserving allocation, , then the procedure gives subsequently θc i to each of the first three creditors. Now, it remains 360, to be divided among the coalition {4, 5}. In order to make this division order preserving, then we have to assign equal losses to both creditors. Therefore, the allocation would be (25, 50, 75, 130, 230) . In each case, the θ−coalitional procedure yields a division of the amount to divide which is order preserving, and it coincides with the allocation proposed for this problem by the corresponding member of the TAL-family R θ .
Final remarks
We have presented in this note a coalitional procedure that characterizes a one-parameter family of bankruptcy rules encompassing three of the most well known rules. The normative appeal of such family seems unquestionable as it has been shown that it satisfies a wide variety of properties reflecting ethical and operational principles [5] . There is, however, no characterization result for the family as a whole, although independent characterizations results for the three focal members of the family abound in the literature [4] , [7] , [8] . This note helps to fill that gap.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning the connections between this work and another interesting topic within the literature on bankruptcy problems that refers to coalitional manipulations of bankruptcy rules [2] , [3] .
If we let agents the possibility of consolidating their claims and be treated as a single creditor or, conversely, we let a particular creditor to divide her claim and be considered as several different creditors then the resulting awards may be altered. It is then worth identifying the precise cases for which creditors will not be able to manipulate the outcomes in their interest via merging or splitting their claims. To do so, let τ (N, c, E) = (c) If θ = δ, the θ−coalitional procedure is a non manipulable (by merging or splitting) mechanism, when restricted to bankruptcy problems on D δ .
It follows from Proposition 1 that if θ = 0 then the corresponding coalitional mechanism is non manipulable by merging for the unrestricted domain of bankruptcy problems. Similarly, if θ = 1 then the corresponding coalitional mechanism is non manipulable by splitting for the unrestricted domain of bankruptcy problems.
